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ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to elicit and structure the factors that shape the execution and, in particular, the 
coordination of work in Out of Hours care. Evenings and weekends in UK hospitals are managed by 
specific Out of Hours (OoH) care arrangements, and associated technology. Managing care within 
the constraints of staff availability and demands is a key concern for both patient care and staff 
wellbeing, yet has received little attention from healthcare human factors. A study of sixteen clinical 
staff used Critical Decision Method to understand how work is coordinated and the constraints and 
criteria that are applied by the roles managing OoH care. The analysis identified ten types of 
coordination decision which, in turn, underpinned three types of adaptive behaviour – pre-emption, 
information augmentation and self-organisation – that were crucial for the effective performance in 
OoH care. These behaviours explain how OoH staff manage the task demands placed on them, 
individually and as a team.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the UK secondary healthcare system at present, 76% of the hours are classified as Out of Hours 
(OoH), including evening and overnight, as well as weekends and national holidays. During OoH 
periods lower numbers of clinicians, supported by fewer resources, work across hospital sites and 
multiple clinical specialities to provide care. Effective coordination of reduced resources is vital, 
balancing the care of patients matched to the right clinical resources, with the workload and 
wellbeing of clinical staff.  
Change has been implemented in the UK’s OoH secondary care system through the Hospital at Night 
(H@N) programme (Mahon et al. 2005; McQuillan et al., 2013), since it was initially piloted in 2004. 
This solution was a response to reductions in the working hours of doctors-in-training (junior 
doctors) under the European Working Time Directive, which required significant organisational and 
cultural adaptation (Hamilton-Fairly et al. 2014). The Hospital at Night system relies on teams of 
clinicians to deliver care OoH through the coordination of junior doctors, supported by senior and 
specialised nurse practitioners and clinical support workers. As such,  
The ethos of H@N is the provision of out-of-hours medical cover by a centralized 
multidisciplinary team, who have the full range of skills and competencies to meet the 
immediate needs of patients. The central tenets include multispeciality handovers, extended 
nursing roles (including prescribing), bleep filtering through central co-ordination and 
ensuring routine work is not carried over into the out-of-hours period (Beckett et al. 2009).  
The verdict on Hospital at Night is that it contributes to improvement in patient care and outcomes 
(“The Case for Hospital at Night – The Search for Evidence” 2008).  There are, however, challenges 
with such a system. In the UK healthcare system, non-surgical secondary care doctors-in-training 
working OoH rotate around both clinical specialities (intra hospital) and geographic locations (inter 
hospital). They are frequently exposed to new scenarios, and have to contend with non-clinical 
pressures such as making sense of unfamiliar hospital systems, finding wards and equipment in 
unfamiliar surroundings or deciding on task priorities. Also, OoH care takes place during long hours 
and at night resulting in potential effects of fatigue. The cognitive, physical and organisational 
challenges faced by staff during OoH work can have a negative impact on their wellbeing, with a 
knock-on effect on the cost of care due to absenteeism and locum cover (“Hospital at Night: 
Benefits, Realisation & Business Case Report” 2007). There is also a reported increase in mortality 
rates (Lockley et al. 2007) during OoH, although there is debate about whether this is caused by 
reduced healthcare quality or other factors, such as lower probability of admission (Raspin & Bassi 
2016; Meacock et al. 2017). Work on handover between day and OoH care (McQuillan et al., 2013) 
has identified the challenges of balancing the need to have all specialisations together to develop a 
common picture of patient needs, while working around staff availability at the beginning and end of 
shifts. Variations in this balance can have marked effects on performance OoH, including failing at 
handover to flag patients that will potentially need OoH care.  
Consequently, concerns about OoH care contribute to controversy around seven day services 
offered by the National Health Service (NHS) and make it an important area for research. There is, 
however, little or no research to date in the ongoing execution of OoH care once it is underway. 
Understanding the range of tasks that various roles are asked to perform, the time taken to perform 
these tasks, and what drives these tasks, is vital to make decisions around appropriate staffing 
numbers and grades (Sharples et al. 2015; Royal College of Physicians, 2018).  
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An overview representation of the Hospital at Night process is provided in best practice guidance 
activity mapping (Figure 1). The example provided is of patients needing unscheduled care, and the 
activities depicted are coordinated by a nurse clinician, who assesses the clinical need, decides if 
Hospital at Night team treatment is necessary and allocates appropriate resources. Leadership 
provided by these nurse clinicians is identified as good practice in Hospital at Night provision 
(“Hospital at Night Baseline Report” 2006). The Hospital at Night  model interconnects with other 
systems employed in hospital, such as task management (Seddon & Hay 2010; Blakey et al. 2012; 
Herrod et al. 2014), handover (Raptis et al. 2009; McQuilian et al, 2013) and early warning scores 
about patient health state (Jones et al. 2011; Gordon & Beckett 2011; Kolic et al. 2015).  
 
FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE FLOWCHART FOR TREATMENT OF PATIENTS NEEDING UNSCHEDULED CARE, ADAPTED FROM BEST 
PRACTICE GUIDANCE, MAPPING HOSPITAL AT NIGHT ACTIVITIES (NPSA 2005, P7) 
The kind of coordination scenario described above is one where actual work is often more complex 
than that originally envisioned. While the kind of configuration described in Figure 1 reflects a 
simple, and mostly unidirectional, model of information flow, in practice different functions are 
more interdependent, and often demonstrate emergent behaviour (Trist 1981; Wilson, 2014), which 
may provide resilience and flexibility to a system given a level of pressure or scenarios not originally 
envisaged by designers. Typical factors leading to divergence between planned and actual work in a 
team setting result from the need for all parties to have an ongoing view of system status. While this 
view may be achieved through ICT-based communication, this can also be supplemented by other 
artefacts. For example, informal notice boards are used in ER rooms to act as a shared 
representation of which beds are in use (Wears et al. 2007). These workarounds may be a reaction 
to inefficiencies in new technology, such as the use of unofficial ‘shadow charts’ to accompany 
formal records that are perceived as being incomplete (Perry & Wears 2012). There are also many 
instances of informal mechanisms, cues and gestures being used to help co-located team members 
give each other shared awareness (Heath & Luff 1992; Garbis & Artman 2004). It has been noted 
that a lack of knowledge about how healthcare interventions are adapted in situ can lead to 
implementation challenges (Back et al. 2017), which has obvious implications for Hospital at Night as 
an approach to OoH care.   
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Importantly, this shared awareness building is not only more fluid and frequent than that typically 
envisaged, it is also more likely to be bidirectional. For example, team members on the ground may 
need to work to repair the understanding of central coordination roles. This can happen when minor 
changes to the availability of people or resources on the ground have led to changes to plans, which 
lead to the coordinator’s model of the system status becoming out of date. Coordinators, therefore, 
need to engage in information seeking behaviours as much as they engage in information giving 
behaviours and this requires technology with the requisite communication channels and bandwidth 
to enable such behaviour. Also, coordination costs time and personal resources (Clark & Wilks-Gibbs 
1986; Hoffman & Woods 2011). The active nature of coordination comes with a workload not just on 
the part of the coordinator but also on the part of coordinated resources to engage in the necessary 
behaviours and communications required for shared understanding. This can be most challenging 
when senior people on the ground do not see the need to check or confirm their actions with those 
perceived to be in less important coordinating roles; part of Crew Resource Management in aviation 
and surgery is a deliberate attempt to make these executive decisions more available to all actors 
(Flin & Maran 2004).   
Technology can play a role in understanding the movements and patterns of clinical staff by sensing 
and monitoring their activity, such as through Wi-Fi positioning (Pinchin et al. 2014; Perez, Pinchin et 
al. 2016b) or through the interpretation of ‘by-product’ data (Perez, Brown et al. 2016a). The 
challenge, however, is that these types of data are currently purely behavioural and overt – they 
capture what people are working on and when, not necessarily the contextual factors that have 
shaped their decisions to take certain actions. Also, tasks may appear to be unanswered in the task 
log (so called ‘legacy’ tasks [Royal College of Physicians, 2018]) yet are managed by care staff. 
Observation studies can help (Brown et al, 2014), but again cognitive activities and rationale remain 
unobservable. Also it is not feasible to collect data simultaneously from multiple people working in a 
coordinated manner across locations in an OoH secondary care setting. 
The following study therefore seeks to understand the factors that shape the coordination of Out of 
Hours care. It takes the model in Figure 1 as a starting point, and uses care staff’s experiences in 
coordination to understand decisions that take place for effective management of OoH care 
resources, and the additional information flows that may occur. As such it offers two key 
contributions: 
1) Filling a critical gap by examining coordination during OoH care. This compliment work such 
McQuillan et al (2013) to understand handover into OoH care. 
2) Description of adaptive behaviours that support OoH care. While originally intended to 
inform the interpretation of objective data such as through Wi-Fi positioning (Pinchin et al. 
2014; Perez, Pinchin et al. 2016b), the analysis uncovered tasks, roles and behaviours that 
were not apparent in the proposed system presented in Figure 1.  
2 METHOD 
2.1 APPROACH 
Eliciting the rationale behind the choices made by actors in the face of different challenges or 
priorities highlights the ways to effectively manage demands. This is particularly the case in OoH 
care where routine concerns of prioritisation and workload (Royal College of Physicians, 2018) are 
exacerbated in the face of new patient needs that might either have been missed at handover or 
have escalated during the period of OoH care (McQuillan et al., 2013).   
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To that end, Critical Decision Method (CDM [Klein et al. 1989; Crandall et al. 2006]) is a widely used 
and well understood method to capture knowledge and constraints relevant to decision-making (e.g. 
Blandford and Wong, 2004; Wong and Blandford, 2004). By applying a series of structured questions 
(see Table 1) related to types of knowledge, environmental cues and constraints, it is possible to 
elicit from experts the bottom-up detail and rationale of decision-making. In order to understand the 
breadth of decisions undertaken by care staff, the use of CDM was adapted to elicit information 
regarding any number of decisions that might take place within an event such as an incident or 
memorable situation. While the approach still uses the same set of questions, and is based in 
participants’ experience of an actual operational occurrence, there was some flexibility in how each 
decision is documented in favour of identifying all decision points germane to the particular event 
selected by the participant. Also, while CDM is based around discussion of non-routine incidents, the 
data on decisions were also intended to express if and how they diverted from the norm, and 
therefore present a more general picture of practice.    
2.2 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were recruited at two large urban NHS teaching hospitals in the East Midlands and 
North West of England, though the incidents recalled during the CDM interviews did not necessarily 
take place at those hospitals. This research was conducted with ethical approval from the University 
of Nottingham and the permission of the hospital trusts.   
Participants were clinical staff at the hospitals who were currently engaged in, or had previous 
experience of, working OoH. Recruitment support was provided by senior clinician gatekeepers who 
made personal introductions of researchers to clinical staff and distributed information about the 
study via internal communication channels. Potential participants who expressed an interest were 
given an information sheet and opportunity to ask questions by the researcher, before they 
provided informed consent. Participation was voluntary and no monetary compensation for their 
time was offered. Participants had the option to enter a prize draw.  
In total, 16 participants were recruited to the study, all of whom are clinicians with OoH experience. 
Six were nurse coordinators: experienced clinicians who oversee and assess care needs OoH, and 
allocate Hospital at Night team resources (as described above). Seven were doctors completing their 
training through the NHS Modernising Medical Careers programme, which involves a minimum of 8 
years total training time for secondary care. Of the seven doctors interviewed, five were Registrars, 
which means they have completed two years foundation doctor training, are in the process of 
undertaking at least six years of speciality training, and are the most senior clinical staff on site in 
hospitals OoH. This range is valuable because it provides the opportunity to capture differences in 
patterns of response dependent on levels of expertise. The remaining three participants were 
Clinical Support Workers (CSWs) who specialise in a limited number of clinical tasks (e.g. taking 
blood samples) and their role in the Hospital at Night team is to take on these tasks. The role of each 
anonymised participant is specified in Table 2. 
2.3 PROTOCOL 
Participants were recruited for individual interviews, lasting no longer than 30 minutes. The 
interviews were arranged at a time and place of the participant’s choosing at their convenience. 
Because of the constraints of interviewing clinicians at work in a non-disruptive manner, it was 
necessary for the protocol to be flexible and adaptable depending on the circumstances of each 
interview. This meant modifying traditional CDM and condensing the interview procedure to suit the 
clinical research context. 
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The interviews followed a prepared script.1 The first few minutes of the encounter were devoted to 
briefing about the study and interview process, prior to confirmation of informed consent. 
Participants were then asked to talk through a memorable OoH incident where resource allocation 
and coordination was particularly challenging, and to give an indication of the sequence of events, 
their duration and the length of time between them. While the participant recalled the situation, the 
researcher converted their description into a timeline sketched on an A3 whiteboard (e.g. Figure 2). 
When this process was complete, researcher and participant reviewed the timeline and agreed on 
two or three key decision points within the situation (circled in Figure 2).  
 
FIGURE 2: EXAMPLE OF TIMELINE CONSTRUCTED AND DECISION POINTS IDENTIFIED DURING INTERVIEW [CDM12] 
The participant was then asked to think about each critical moment in more detail. A set of 
questions, presented in Table 1, were used by the researcher to guide this discussion, in order to 
clarify and interrogate the decision, and reveal the cognitive and affective factors at work in that 
moment. These questions included some final hypothetical alternatives about different actions 
possible under the circumstances, to elicit information about the significance of experience and 
training.  
  
                                                          
1 The full protocol is available at: https://wayward.wp.horizon.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Interview-
Protocols.pdf 
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TABLE 1: QUESTIONS USED TO PROBE CRITICAL DECISIONS 
Probing Questions 
Regarding decision-making: 
 What were the possible courses of action you considered? Why did you choose this option? 
 What were your specific goals in doing this? 
 How much time pressure were you under? 
Regarding knowledge and experience: 
 Did you seek help at this point? How did you know where to turn for guidance? 
 Is this a type of event you’re trained to deal with? What training or experience did you draw 
on? 
Regarding assessment and sense making: 
 Was this like anything you’d previously experienced? What about that was relevant to this 
case? 
 What consequences of this action did you imagine? How did you think events would unfold? 
 How did you feel at this point? 
Regarding hypothetical alternatives: 
 Can you speculate a bit about ways you might have responded differently in this situation, and 
how this would have altered the outcome? 
 Would someone with more or less experience than you have acted differently? Would they 
have noticed the same things? How would they know what to do? 
 What additional training, information or experience might have helped you or improved the 
outcome? 
 
2.4 ANALYSIS 
The interviews were transcribed and combined with the timelines for analysis, which was carried out 
in three iterative, deepening stages. First, the incidents described by clinicians were summarised and 
coded into identifiable situation types with role-specific contributors (see section 3.1). The second 
stage involved thematic analysis of the data. Primary coding identified specific decision-making 
instances within the incidents, combining these into general decision types. Secondary coding was 
carried out within each decision type to identify emergent themes common across participants and 
incidents (Corbin & Strauss 2014; Robson & McCartan 2016; Wong & Blandford 2002). These sub-
themes typically represented constraints on decision-making. At this stage the decision types and 
their constraints were examined separately and coded uniquely (see section 3.2). The third and final 
stage of analysis synthesised situation types, decision types and constraints to understand the 
structure of work within Hospital at Night teams. This allowed actual information flows to be 
mapped, in relation to the original expected model as shown in Figure 1, and consistent coordination 
behaviours to be identified (see section 3.3). 
The interviews and analyses were carried out by the same researcher. Another researcher coded the 
whole sample to check for interrater agreement of decision types and emergent themes. While no 
formal quantification of interrater reliability was performed, the two researchers collaborated after 
review to identify a consensual set of decisions (Campbell et al. 2013). 
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3 RESULTS 
3.1 SITUATION TYPES AND ROLE-SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTORS 
Table 2 summarises the incidents described by participants. These fell into two types – emergency 
siutations or task management.  
Emergency situations are those urgent clinical tasks that arise unexpectedly in the course of patient 
care (e.g. cardiac arrest, rapid deterioration in a patient’s health state). These incidents are 
described by doctors and coordinators, but not CSWs. Although CSWs described dealing with 
clinically urgent tasks, the type of tasks they are asked to perform (e.g. taking blood samples) do not 
seem to pose task management challenges in the way that immediate responses to emergencies 
(e.g. cardiac arrest) impact upon doctors and coordinators. Because Hospital at Night coordinators 
are senior nurse clinicians they respond to cardiac arrest alongside doctors and cannot oversee 
other clinical resource allocation until the emergency is over (e.g. CDM2). 
Task management situations were typically those where the major challenge was to allocate or 
organise people or tasks to meet clinical needs in an efficient manner. Some of these situations 
covered the prioritisation of tasks (i.e. the appropriate ordering of tasks) and are found across the 
clinical roles examined (e.g. CDM3 for a Doctor; CDM7 for a Coordinator). However, other workload 
pressures seem to be more particular to certain roles. Two of the registrars interviewed described 
situations in which the management of physical resources (e.g. beds available in the hospital – 
CDM10) contributed to challenges associated with their task management. This is apparently a 
source of tension for these individuals in positions of clinical seniority. Two of the CSWs interviewed 
described situations in which the allocation of tasks (i.e. the division and distribution of tasks 
between more than one person – CDM12) presents challenges. This is because they were allocated 
tasks that were geographically dispersed around the hospital site and could not therefore complete 
them efficiently. In this clinical support role, the participants have self-imposed expectations about 
optimal task length and routines for tackling tasks. 
3.2 DECISION TYPES 
All the decisions described by interview participants and included in the timelines of the incidents 
they recounted were coded. This process produced ten types into which all the decisions can be 
classified, presented in Table 3. The first column indicates the prevalence of the decision types 
within the interview data, gives illustrative examples of questions clinicians ask in reaching decisions 
and indicates the most prevalent constraints associated with decision types. The second column 
provides thumbnail descriptions of decision types. Findings of the thematic decision analysis are 
supported by excerpts of data in the third column. Decisions are presented in order of most 
common types in terms of counts of sources. 
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TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF MEMORABLE INCIDENTS DESCRIBED BY CLINICIANS IN INTERVIEWS 
ID Role Incident Situation Type 
CDM1 Coordinator 
Cardiac arrest occupies coordinator (and two thirds of the 
H@N team) for an hour, during which time an alert is 
received that another patient is acutely unwell. 
Emergency 
CDM2 Coordinator 
Coordinator supporting other clinicians dealing with a very 
poorly surgical patient, when senior staff are unavailable, 
providing care as well as managing H@N. 
Emergency 
CDM3 Doctor 
Time consuming investigations for sick patient in an acute 
admissions unit mean new admissions and other jobs have 
to wait and are handed on to the next shift. 
Task 
management 
[prioritisation] 
CDM4 Coordinator 
Coordinator reflects on helping inexperienced doctors 
realise a patient with heart failure (acute pulmonary 
oedema) needs advanced oxygen treatment (CPAP). 
Emergency 
CDM5 Coordinator 
While responding to a cardiac arrest and performing 
resuscitation, a coordinator is alerted about a trauma 
patient, suspects a major bleed, and organises urgent care.  
Emergency 
CDM6 Doctor 
Doctor called to a ward and discovers 9 patients require 
clerking. Requests assistance from another doctor to 
complete tasks before the end of the OoH shift.  
Task 
management 
[prioritisation] 
CDM7 Coordinator 
Busy twilight to nightshift handover for an inexperienced 
H@N coordinator with a large existing workload and urgent 
admissions on the stroke ward in particular. 
Task 
management 
[prioritisation] 
CDM8 Coordinator 
Coordinator managing high workload in a particular area at 
the start of the shift is confronted by 3 urgent tasks in the 
same area. 
Task 
management 
[prioritisation] 
CDM9 CSW 
CSW assigned 24 tasks at the start of a Sunday night shift, 
some of which are longstanding, making prioritisation 
(based on urgency, wait length and location) difficult. 
Task 
management 
[prioritisation] 
CDM10 
Doctor 
[Registrar] 
Requests from wards for Registrar to decide whether a 
patient can be moved because the bed is required. Must be 
managed alongside emergencies and junior colleagues. 
Task 
management 
[resources] 
CDM11 CSW 
CSW has 15 tasks, 3 of which originated the previous shift. 
The rest of the tasks, of equal clinical urgency, are in a 
different location and will take 3 hours to complete. 
Task 
management 
[allocation] 
CDM12 CSW 
CSW liaises with counterpart working at other end of the 
hospital site to respond to urgent tasks being 
inappropriately allocated by supernumerary coordinator.  
Task 
management 
[allocation] 
CDM13 
Doctor 
[Registrar] 
Registrar must swiftly plan and delegate care of a sick 
patient because required to attend and manage successive 
cardiac arrests. Other senior staff are unavailable.  
Emergency 
CDM14 
Doctor 
[Registrar] 
Registrar hands over care of an unclear case to another 
team, is called away to an emergency, and then another. 
Recalled to original patient, who has rapidly deteriorated.  
Emergency 
CDM15 
Doctor 
[Registrar] 
On-call doctor reviewing a patient with an unfamiliar 
condition, receives a call about post-op bleeding of an 
infant patient at another hospital 45 minutes’ drive away. 
Task 
management 
[prioritisation] 
CDM16 
Doctor 
[Registrar] 
2 patients requiring specialist treatment cannot be moved 
because no beds are available. Doctor must either keep 
reviewing them or organise moving them. 
Task 
management 
[resources] 
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TABLE 3: DECISION TYPES (INCLUDING KEY CONSTRAINTS AND COUNTS); SUMMARY OF DECISION TYPE; EXAMPLES FROM TRANSCRIPTS  
Decision type 
 
Summary Examples 
D1 - MANAGE WORKLOAD 
What is my strategy for dealing with 
the present situation? How do I plan 
to meet multiple demands? 
Constraints: Build-up; Multitasking; 
Sharing workload 
 
Coded in 13 sources (43 references) 
 Decision of approach for tackling multiple tasks.  
 While ‘Evaluate Tasks’ involves comparison and prioritisation, 
managing workload is about situation in overview.  
 How tasks can be efficiently distributed among the clinicians 
working in an OoH team. 
 High volume of tasks due to build-up; tasks from previous shift, non-
urgent requests or inability to move patients through system. 
 Often, only way to deal with workload is sharing with other 
clinicians. 
 Exchanges depend on roles: registrars delegate, coordinators 
(re)allocate, inexperienced junior doctors and CSWs negotiate. 
‘…I had to log onto a computer and try and get the jobs 
going again because, like, for neutropenic sepsis you 
only have an hour response time to treatment. If I left 
it for the full time of the cardiac arrest we’d have 
missed that window’ (CDM1). 
‘I said well do you mind if I send these north corridor 
jobs …? And she agreed to do it. I said look send to me 
if you get any south corridor jobs’ (CDM12). 
‘It can go on for five minutes if there’s beds available, 
and it can go on for most of the day if there’s no beds 
available’ (CDM16). 
D2 - EVALUATE TASKS 
What should I do now? What takes 
priority? What will I do afterwards? 
Constraints: Comparison with other 
tasks; Current Situation; Escalation 
 
Coded in 12 sources (28 references) 
 Decision based on comparison of incoming against existing tasks, 
organised into a hierarchy of urgency. 
 Placing of task in this hierarchy depends on information availability 
and interpretation.  
 Situational factors are described as having an impact on the 
‘threshold’ for giving priority to a particular task; factors include 
clinical indicators, proximity to patient, nature of treatment, 
availability of appropriate staff, prior knowledge. 
‘So I allocated the work and looked at really what was 
urgent at that time that needed to go to doctors in 
other areas and what could wait until things had 
settled down, and the urgent patients had been seen’ 
(CDM7). 
‘In my head is the fact that I’m with someone that I 
already think is sick, on one site, and the fact that the 
other patient’s 45 minutes away’ (CDM15). 
D3 - ATTEND PATIENT 
Do I need to attend the patient? 
Where is the patient? Is it safe to 
leave where I am now? 
Constraints: Patient needs; 
Presence; Staff capacity 
 
Coded in 12 sources (25 references) 
 Staff quickly determine where their presence will be most effective.  
 May choose to stay with a sick patient because they are concerned 
to keep them safe. 
 Can depend upon on particular clinical skills, treatment 
requirements and patient needs. 
 Also decide to attend / stay based on capacity of other staff at the 
time: offering support to colleagues, or undertaking tasks when no 
one else is available. 
‘It's very hard to leave that situation, somebody acutely 
unwell, particularly if the cardiologists are busy, as they 
usually are, so you end up doing a lot more. Like, I had 
to speak to family twice and make escalation decisions 
and plans on a patient who was alive and they couldn’t 
get hold of his cardiologist and things, while my 
patient's sick somewhere else’ (CDM13). 
D4 - RESPOND TO ALERT 
Do I respond? When do I need to 
respond? 
Constraints: Availability; Follow-up; 
Time window 
 
 Decision to respond to notification of urgent new task (automatic 
alert triggered by a high early warning score; bleep from a ward / 
coordinator for call back). 
 Alerts themselves are no more than a call to action; the response 
involves finding out what is going on and what is required. 
 Difficult to act until current task is under control or completed. 
‘I might get an escalation alert on the high EWS, and 
then I’ll wait ten minutes for the staff to contact me, 
because they should contact me, and then I will ring 
and say, you know, I notice you’ve escalated’ (CDM4). 
‘So we have to do it, the bed manager or the site 
manager on call or whoever they are, they give you a 
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Coded in 12 sources (23 references)  Strategies such as a grace period considered acceptable before a 
follow-up alert and/or response is expected.  
 Although there may be complaints from others the bottom-line 
justification is immediate patient safety and clinical priority.  
 Because alerts are associated with clinical emergencies, any limiting 
factors on ability to respond can be a cause of stress. 
phone call, it’s not really negotiable. I think the last 
time I couldn’t get to it because there were clinical 
emergencies which obviously take priority they called 
the on call consultant and complained’ (CDM10). 
D5 - HELP AND SUPPORT 
Do I need help? Could I offer 
support? 
Constraints: Hospital at Night; 
Seniority; System capacity 
 
Coded in 11 sources (37 references) 
 
 Decision to request intervention or support when pressures on 
individual / system reach a level that additional actors are required. 
 Unmanageable build-up of tasks within a reasonable timeframe or 
clinical situation requires escalating to senior clinicians. 
 Important skill to recognise themselves when they need support; 
less experienced clinicians can take longer to realise they cannot 
manage alone; reticent to call on others. Senior roles (registrars, 
coordinators) rely on ability to direct others to initiate treatment. 
 Familiarity with OoH means participants know support mechanisms 
they can utilise; easier when there are pre-existing connections with 
senior colleagues, or established team relationships. 
‘The F2 will probably think about it, maybe don’t want 
to be seen as a failure or not coping, and probably 
would take much longer to come to the conclusion … 
they’re actually needing some help with their other 
tasks, or actually those other tasks can wait’ (CDM4). 
‘When I was in respiratory I, I phoned up the co-
ordinator at the time and asked them, could they just 
have a look through for the ones with lack of 
information and just give them a quick ring’ (CDM9). 
‘As you get senior … you get more aware of when you 
need to seek that advice from someone else’ (CDM14). 
D6 - GATHER INFORMATION 
Do I need to know more? What do I 
need to know? How do I find out? 
Constraints: Ascertain situation; 
Collaboration; Role requirements 
 
Coded in 10 sources (18 references) 
 Decision whether more knowledge is required in order to determine 
the correct course of action.  
 Sometimes staff take initiative to find out necessary details 
themselves; other times they work through details with colleagues. 
 When dividing staff or time resources across tasks, available 
resources and task requirements will determine the best fit under 
the circumstances. 
 If existing information about a task is insufficient, gleaning more 
through conversations can be time consuming. However, it is 
considered valuable in order to ensure quality of care.  
 For registrars / coordinators overseeing other staff, can be a matter 
of checking with clinicians to pre-empt potential problems. 
‘[I] came back to the office and was able to sit down 
with the co-ordinator, … and able to look at the screen 
and … set up the phone, … you’ve got all the 
information and it’s easier to actually get through the 
tasks’ (CDM9). 
‘[S]ometimes if I get my alert on the phone and I’m 
thinking this patient doesn’t quite sound right I will 
actually pick up the phone and just call and say what 
have you done so far, are you happy, do you want me 
to come across’ (CDM10). 
D7 - COMMUNICATE INFORMATION 
What do I need to tell people? Who 
do I need to tell? 
Constraints: Clinical situation; 
Liaising; Workload issues 
 
Coded in 9 sources (23 references) 
 Decision whether to brief someone else, often because they intend 
to hand over task responsibility. Details passed to facilitate other 
people’s decision-making and judgement. 
 Professional conventions / working practices govern procedures for 
distributing information. Escalation policy dictates more senior 
clinicians must be told about sick patients. 
‘My information to the F1 was, I need you to go to this 
ward now to see this patient … who came in with this 
injury and the drain is filling fast….  I will send you on 
the information’ (CDM5). 
‘I said I’m going to be busy on this side of the hospital 
…, can any of you take those three for South? If not 
they'll get done but we might need to ring the wards 
12 
 
  Sometimes negotiation with other teams of clinicians is necessary, 
to enlist their support or draw on their specialist knowledge. 
 When a patient is poorly, the priority is to impart salient clinical 
details for best treatment. 
 When managing a high volume of tasks, communication explains 
delay and confirms nothing has been forgotten or ignored. 
and explain that there’s one of me, and they’re in a 
priority list’ (CDM11). 
D8 - HAND OVER TASK 
Can I pass task to someone else? Is it 
safe for me to step away now? Is 
there more I can do? Should I turn 
my attention elsewhere?  
Constraints: Requesting or 
requested; Safe hands; Task load 
 
Coded in 9 sources (14 references) 
 Decision to hand over task when staff they feel confident that they 
have done everything in their capacity for a patient. 
 Can leave them in the care of someone appropriately qualified. 
Depending on role, participants either delegate tasks (coordinators 
and registrars) or request that tasks are reallocated (inexperienced 
junior doctors, CSWs). 
 Under some circumstances clinicians deal with an uncomfortable 
task load by transferring some or all of it to other people. 
‘The ITU registrar followed quite shortly after; [the 
surgical registrar] was still there. ... [T]here was plenty 
of support, so I felt I could leave’ (CDM2). 
‘I feel bad for the F1 if they've got a lot handed over 
from me, because it also means that they might have a 
backlog and then it kind of perpetuates to the next day’ 
(CDM3). 
D9 - FOLLOW ROUTINE 
Can I go back to what I was doing 
before? Will things proceeding 
normally from now on? 
Constraints: Nature of original plan; 
Safe practice; Shared patterns 
 
Coded in 7 sources (15 references) 
 
 Decide when challenging situation is resolved and it’s appropriate to 
turn to non-urgent tasks. 
 Clinician may not deviate from established patterns despite 
emergency, provided safe practice is being followed. 
 Participants have developed techniques to accommodate their own 
and colleagues’ personal needs within shift. 
 Be aware and fit with ways other clinicians’ work; be seen to do so. 
 CSWs and coordinators develop more routinized working patterns 
than junior doctors, possibly due to more predictability and less 
variety in tasks. 
‘And as soon as they’d [the doctors] sorted these 
[urgent tasks] out then we went back to the geography, 
and I’d highlighted … jobs that they needed to do first’ 
(CDM8). 
‘I would follow the logical route … of the tasks, unless 
there was an urgent one or a timed one, then I’d have 
to come off that route and go and do it and then come 
back to it’ (CDM11). 
D10 - ORGANISE STAFF 
Who is best placed to deal with this? 
Who is available?  
What are their skills? 
Constraints: Available resources; 
Briefing; Responsiveness 
 
Coded in 7 sources (18 references) 
 
 Decision to implement strategy to resolve challenging situation 
relying on other clinicians. 
 Only applies to registrars and coordinators, who manage others 
within OoH care, rather than requesting ‘Help and Support’. 
 Although systems in place for escalation, staff are flexible and 
responsive to circumstances.  
 Matching clinical needs to staff available; requires careful briefing 
about what treatment to instigate.  
 Staff reorganised in unusual ways compared with normal working. 
‘I called a doctor off the admission area. We have a 
vague awareness of admission work but we don’t know 
sick patients, so that is an issue for us, … but I know by 
taking somebody off … I am leaving two people on 
there, so you’re not leaving that area unsafe’ (CDM8). 
‘So when she came down … she was a bit shocked that 
there were quite so many who had arrived.  Then I just 
set out what I’d done and said, I’ve done these two, 
what we’ve got left is this, this, that and that ….  
[W]hat do you fancy seeing?’ (CDM6). 
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3.3 INFORMATION FLOWS AND COORINATION BEHAVIOURS 
Finally, analysis of situation types and decision types together supported an overall model of 
information flow and communication. Figure 3 overlays (in grey) roles and activities described in 
interviews on top of the best practice mapping for Hospital at Night depicted in Figure 1. This shows 
the flow of information from nurses on the wards, through to coordinators, who are senior nurse 
clinicians. Coordinators are the conduit for information to pass to other resources in the Hospital at 
Night team, in cases where coordinators deem treatment cannot be provided on wards or by 
themselves. Clinical support workers (CSWs) receive information about set tasks that are their 
responsibility. Doctors and registrars receive information about clinical tasks based on coordinators’ 
assessment of patient needs.  The arrows show both the flow, and direction, of information 
associated with decision-making about clinical tasks. These illustrate that doctors and CSWs return 
as well as accept tasks they have been allocated by coordinators, and registrars delegate tasks to 
doctors. 
 
FIGURE 3: MAPPING HOSPITAL AT NIGHT ACTIVITIES INCLUDING INFORMATION FLOWS WITHIN THE TEAM 
As the information flows from the coordinator through to various clinical workers, different 
reflective decisions take place, but additionally, the coordinator engages in responsive, emergency 
orientated decisions. For example, a coordinating nurse will hear of a critical medical need to add to 
the coordination list, but decide that the urgency or limited availability of resources requires them to 
put coordination responsibilities on hold while they go and assist in an emergency situation (e.g. 
CDM3). Other roles engage in responsive decisions, primarily regarding emergencies and how this 
affects both the provision of care to the patient in the emergency situation, but also their availability 
for other potential tasks. For example, ascertaining that a patient’s condition is not critical allows a 
registrar to entrust immediate care to more junior clinicians (e.g. CDM15). Registrars occupy a 
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position of clinical responsibility and, therefore, their decisions have to account for immediate 
patient needs and also the wider care context within the system as a whole (e.g. CDM10). 
The flow of information between clinicians gives rise to behaviours – allowing them to respond pre-
emptively to patient needs, to augment their understanding of a clinical task, or to organise among 
themselves without recourse to the coordinator – which are summarised in Table 4 and discussed 
below. For example: 
 Wards pass on additional tasks to clinicians in person when they are treating patients; and 
coordinators contact or visit wards to reassure them and offer clinical help [pre-emption]. 
 Coordinators – and doctors and CSWs via coordinators - require clarification from wards 
about patient needs [information augmentation].  
 Doctors and CSWs collaborate between themselves to organise tasks and task load [self-
organisation]. 
TABLE 4: SUMMARY OF EMERGENT BEHAVIOURS WITHIN OOH ACTIVITIES 
Information 
Organisation 
Goals 
Socio-Technical  
‘System’ Affordances 
Pre-emption 
- Maximise efficiency  
- Proactively control workload  
- Clinician location within hospital 
- Coordinator oversight & clinical 
skill 
Information 
augmentation 
- Improve information accuracy & 
completeness 
- Provide reassurance 
- Correct system mistakes 
- Bidirectional communication 
- Wanting to be ‘Eyes on’ with 
patient, to understand status for 
themselves 
Self-organisation 
- Adapt to local criteria & specifics 
of role 
- Delegate/share tasks 
- Second opinions 
- Sending informal messages and 
calls 
- Using the native affordances of 
handheld mobile devices 
 
These the three emergent behaviours can be overlaid on to expected Hospital at Night activities 
(Figure 4). 
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FIGURE 4: EMERGENT BEHAVIOURS AT PLAY IN HOSPITAL AT NIGHT TEAMS AND ACTIVITIES 
Pre-emption refers to tasks being performed that might never make it to a formal task list. It 
therefore refers to proactive behaviours and actions rather than an anticipatory state of readiness. It 
is a behaviour that has also been observed occurring when Emergency Departments are under 
pressure (Back et al. 2017). The obvious example of pre-emption described in our interviews is when 
coordinators leave the desk in response to a clinical emergency or to go round wards to see if there 
are any clinical needs they can deal with. Such tasks may never make it into the task management 
data, therefore existing as ‘invisible work’ within the Hospital at Night system (Suchman 1995), and 
therefore missing from behavioural analysis. Yet work of this nature forms a significant part of both 
the task demand experienced by the coordinator, and their availability to perform coordination. 
Information augmentation refers to communication activities and information flows in addition to, 
and in support of, the information flow (i.e. task allocation) expressed within the Hospital at Night 
system. This information flow typically covers supplementary queries about task allocation, patient 
health state and help required, often (but not always) mediated through the coordinator (e.g. the 
doctor seeks clarification through the coordinator; the coordinator seeks additional information on 
patient status from the ward). Though it contains useful information for allocating tasks, this 
additional communication imposes additional task demands.  For example, the lag between alerts 
arriving at coordinators and being sent out to care staff, or a lag in accepting a task, may not be due 
to inefficiencies or perceived low priority, but a need for staff to seek additional information to 
confirm the urgency of work and availability of resource. But this might often require staff to send 
additional information to confirm they are aware of the request. 
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Self-organisation refers to additional coordination going on after the formal allocation of tasks to 
clinical staff. This includes clinical support workers collaborating with each other to allocate tasks 
based on factors such as location, or ease of maintaining a routine. For doctors, several patients 
might remain concurrently under their immediate care and they will balance load between 
themselves and their colleagues until they feel confident they can handover each patient in turn. In 
terms of behavioural data, the constraints that lead to this self-organisation (load balancing, 
geography of the hospital) explain why care staff act in a manner that deviates from the tasks they 
are being presented with, and suggests additional optimisation constraints that need to be reflected 
in OoH technology. 
4 Discussion 
The aim of the work was to understand coordination behaviours during OoH care. This complements 
existing knowledge of OoH handover (e.g. McQuillan et al., 2013) and supplements the 
interpretation of objective data such as through Wi-Fi positioning or task logs (Pinchin et al. 2014; 
Perez, Pinchin et al. 2016b).  
A number of implications emerge from thematic analysis (presented in Figure 3) of the decision 
types described by clinicians interviewed. First, there is no single decision that shapes coordination, 
but rather there are a series of decisions that must take place in order for coordination to take place. 
For the coordinator, this involves understanding the available resources (D10) and staff capacity (D3) 
that determine the limits of wider hospital and staff capacity (D5) within the current situation (D2). 
Also, these decisions are not just on the part of the designated coordinator role, but also shaped by 
the other roles that are being coordinated. There are additional role requirements and shared 
patterns shaping coordination across the whole Hospital at Night system. For example, CSWs needed 
to manage their coordination based on location and how they could group tasks (D9), rather than 
just on a task-by-task basis. This demonstrates that control and coordination is not linear but is 
dynamic and interdependent (Flach 2012), in that allocation is contingent on how other people are 
already performing the tasks allocated to them. Analysis of decisions, and therefore the use of tools 
to support decision-making or analyses of observational data, cannot be pinned to one place or one 
point in time. It also demonstrates that the need for a shared view across roles needs to be 
maintained beyond handover (McQuilan et al., 2013) and across the whole period of OoH.  
Second, information flow is two-way rather than just a simple allocation of tasks. This typically 
covers availability (D4), individual task load and assistance requested (D8). There is also briefing 
(D10) from the coordinator back to staff who are raising priority issues, to communicate the nature 
of the wider clinical situation (D7). This information flow demonstrates the need of the group as a 
whole to actively maintain the coordinator’s awareness of clinicians’ workload issues (Woods & 
Branlat 2010). Communication is also information seeking to ascertain the situation (D6) and safe 
practice (D9) regarding specific patient needs (D3). Currently, electronic channels do not adequately 
support this exchange. There are even instances where a phone call alone is not enough and the 
coordinator feels the need to go to see a patient and be a physical presence on the ward(s), which 
involves both time away from coordination and, often, being drawn into actual clinical support. This 
reflects the needs for more detailed, often perceptual information required for effective decision-
making than that supported through technology alone (Hutton & Klein 1999). It is possible that 
requirements analysis based on all communication would highlight at least some information that 
could be passed via an electronic system (e.g. alongside EWS), but the need to be ‘eyes on’, 
expressed by several participants, means there is always a role for face-to-face communications, and 
this needs to be supported and resourced.  
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The need for coordination highlights the issue of task demands. Frequently clinicians were involved 
in the management of parallel tasks that build-up, requiring multitasking (D1), comparison to 
prioritise and escalation to senior colleagues as appropriate (D2). One of the unexpected outcomes 
of the CDM interviews was how much time was spent by coordinators in active support of clinical 
tasks. Alternatively, registrars felt their clinical responsiveness (D10) was inhibited by the need to 
make coordination decisions about allocation of beds and progress of patients beyond their 
immediate care. Both of these illustrate that coordination is not neutral but comes with a cost (Clark 
& Wilkes-Gibbs 1986; Hoffman & Woods 2004): in the case of the coordinators, it is a cost they are 
not always able to meet, and for registrars as a cost that interferes with the requirements of clinical 
seniority (D5) and their responsibility to provide safe hands (D8). Processes are dynamic, continuous 
and exhibit simultaneity, which are key characteristics of complexity (Feltovich et al. 2004). It is also 
another dimension of interdependency (Flach 2012), in that the coordinators themselves become 
part of the equation of which resources are available for care.  It also highlights that task and 
behavioural data derived from sources such as responses to task logs, such as apparently 
unattended tasks (Royal College of Physicians, 2018) does not always reflect activity on the ground. 
The implication is that models of resourcing or workload need to account not just for clinical tasks 
but also for time and effort spent by all parties (not just coordinators) engaged in the act of 
coordination. Also, models need to acknowledge the clinical time spent by the coordinator. 
Finally, less experienced doctors (and the other clinicians working with them) commented that they 
lacked the expertise to identify the appropriate time window for a task and when to follow-up (D4), 
did not have confidence to ask others for additional resources, and could end up in a situation where 
they were overwhelmed. In this respect, and acknowledging the limitation of training as a simplistic 
solution for systemic problems, there is a place here for non-technical skills (Flin & Maran 2004). This 
is most applicable for junior doctors to develop the knowledge of cues and confidence that allow 
more experienced staff to quickly identify that more resources are needed. This potentially applies 
to other staff in how they make themselves amenable to being asked. The reported increase in 
willingness to ask for help as experience grows suggests positive cultural influence at work. 
Other research into healthcare systems under pressure has argued that understanding and 
supporting system flexibility in response to goals should be considered alongside training in best 
practice working standards (Back et al. 2017). The overarching aim of this study was to capture 
factors that shape coordination decision making and would therefore help with the interpretation of 
OoH behavioural data. For example, one challenge was to understand gaps within task management 
data generated by the Hospital at Night system, such as when legacy tasks appear to go unattended 
(Royal College of Physicians, 2018). To that end, the results highlight three emergent behaviours that 
occur in parallel with the Hospital at Night system and shape how tasks are allocated and managed. 
These behaviours - pre-emption, information augmentation and self-organisation - are in no way 
‘failings’ of OoH care but, instead, are adaptive ways that users manage the core functions of OoH 
care, including the Hospital at Night technology and processes, to best fit their current geographical, 
organisational and situational (i.e. current patient load) context and, therefore, maintain control 
(Hollnagel et al. 2006). All three are also examples of the kind of hidden or ‘shadow’ behaviours 
required for coordination found by Perry & Wears (2012), though they are purely procedural and 
communicative, rather than being based in any informal artefact.  
There are a number of limitations with the current study. First, in the end, participant numbers are 
small numbers from each role, though participants would often give their perspectives on other 
roles, not just their own. Nonetheless, building numbers is desirable, and the method has recently 
been applied with similar roles in a different health trust. These additional data will also help 
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understand the applicability of these results across different OoH care regimes. This is important 
given that adaptations to Hospital at Night may be local to a given setting (Perry & Wears 2012).  A 
second limitation is that CDM enquires in relation to particularly memorable, mostly highly 
demanding, events. The risk is therefore that findings and models are built around atypical events. 
Anecdotal evidence from discussion both with participants and with clinicians in a project steering 
role is that the events presented by participants were fairly typical of OoH care.  
5 CONCLUSION 
The findings of this study provide an account of the complexity of OoH work and coordination 
processes among groups of clinicians working in the Hospital at Night system. This extends previous 
work to understand handover into OoH service (McQuillan et al., 2013) by considering the actual 
execution of OoH care, and therefore fills a critical gap in the human factors healthcare literature.  
CDM interviews have been used to understand the complexity of decisions and information 
organisation behaviours OoH, which has developed from the implementation of Hospital at Night. 
Crucially we see that not all behaviours that make the system work are in fact captured by the 
technical aspects of the system (e.g. task logs). This is most obvious in the case of the coordinator, 
but all roles engage in supplemental activity to make the coordination system work. In many cases, 
this comes with its own workload that needs to be factored into any recording or policy of OoH 
management. Therefore, the reductive tendency (Feltovich et al. 2004) found in describing and 
designing cognitive systems is also applicable to the observation and analysis of OoH care. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, it shows the limitations of relying on a purely linear model of task allocation 
(both for design, and for analysis of quantitative data) assumed in Figure 1. 
Future directions for this work could involve adaptions to the system to acknowledge and facilitate 
bi-directional information flow. A particular gap is identified in when and how junior staff 
communicate that they need additional support. Also, technical and procedural means need to 
reflect how the care coordinator also remains actively involved in coordination even when they are 
also pulled into direct patient care. Any intervention to address these points could then be 
measured, not only through task management measures (Perez et al., 2016) or positioning data 
(Pinchin et al., 2014) but also through performance measures of care (McQuillan et al., 2013). 
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